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Abstract 
A significant feature of the 'New Public Management' has been the particular 
emphasis it placed on public sector organisations measuring their performance. 
However, in practice, this has often been carried out in ways which proved 
dysfunctional: for example, by concentrating on a single dimension of 
performance, perverse incentives and unintended consequences arise. 
 
The previous performance measurement regime for the English ambulance 
service was regarded as a classic example of this since it concentrated on 
response times at the expense of other aspects of performance, such as the 
outcomes of treatment at the scene. However, that regime has been replaced 
by a 'dashboard',  containing a wider range of performance indicators. At the 
same time, NHS organisations (including ambulance services) have to produce 
annual Quality Accounts. Thus English ambulance services are now faced with 
two new performance measurement regimes. Both of these seem, in principle, 
an improvement on the old regime; but also seem somewhat contradictory in 
their 'philosophies'. 
 
These developments are worthy of further exploration and, in this paper, we 
set out a research agenda, whilst placing the issues in the context of debates 
concerning multi-dimensional approaches to performance evaluation, such as 
the Balanced Scorecard and Tableau de Bord, and, more generally, the 
'paradox of performance' in public services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
Attempts to measure and manage performance are a long standing feature of 
the public services, despite the inherent difficulties. De Bruijn (2002) sets out 
the potential advantages, disadvantages and risks of performance evaluation 
systems, together with principles for their successful design. Indeed, an 
enhanced role for performance management is a key feature of the 'New Public 
Management' (NPM). (See, for example, Pollitt, 1986; Hood,1991; Hood, 1995; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Talbot, 2005). There is an extensive academic 
literature on the topic (Johnsen, 2005), much of which points to potential 
perverse incentives and unintended consequences  and debates about targets 
and performance indicators, therefore, are an integral part of the NPM 
literature (Wankhade, 2011). Heath & Radcliffe (2007) attempted to draw on 
these critiques in examining the performance measurement regime which then 
applied to the English Ambulance service. 
 
That regime concentrated on only one aspect of performance: response times. 
Therefore, evaluation was based on a fairly crude set of measures, which gave 
an unbalanced assessment of service delivery. In particular, the lack of 
measures evaluating the outcomes of ambulance service interventions has 
been much criticised. (See Heath & Radcliffe, 2007; Heath & Radcliffe, 2010; 
Wankhade, 2011.) This was a significant criticism because the role of the 
ambulance professional has evolved from only being concerned with 
stabilisation of patients and transportation to the hospital towards the 
utilisation of a greater range of skills in a wider variety of situations; including 
an expanded range of activities at the scene (Commission for Health 
Improvement, 2003; Department of Health, 2005; Healthcare Commission, 
2008; National Audit Office, 2011). 
 
Recently, however, the performance measurement regime for English 
ambulance services has been altered significantly. A larger number of 
indicators now apply addressing more dimensions of performance, with many  
relating to outcomes. These are reported monthly in the form of 'dashboards', 
which are intended to give a more balanced assessment of the work of each 
ambulance service. While this is to be welcomed in principle, a number of 
issues arise. For example, do the new indicators form a sort of balanced 
scorecard for ambulance services or, instead, is there just a multiplicity of 
indicators which may lead to confusion and unintended consequences? In 
addition, all NHS organisations, including ambulance services, are required to 
develop and publish Quality Accounts. These are a form of annual performance 
report and the logic behind them is somewhat different to that of the 
Ambulance dashboard. Thus the dynamics of the interplay between the two 
new approaches to performance reporting are likely to be significant. 
 
In this paper, we discuss intriguing issues which arise from the new 
arrangements and  set out a potential research agenda. This discussion is 
informed by  brief accounts of the development of multiple performance score 
cards, such as the Balanced Scorecard and Tableau de Bord and of the 'puzzle 
of performance' in the public sector. 
 
Performance Score Cards 
It has been recognised for some time in the accounting literature that reliance 
on a single measure of performance, such as Return on Investment, can be 
misguided and, therefore, multiple models of performance evaluation have 
been developed. The best known is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), which was 
introduced by Kaplan & Norton in 1992 and has been developed by them and 
others through a number of versions since (see, for example, Kaplan & Norton, 
1992; Kaplan & Norton 1996a; Olve, Roy & Wetter, 1999.)  The BSC is  a 
framework to assist the design and implementation of strategic performance 
management in organisations by integrating external and internal perspectives, 
short term and long term objectives, financial and non-financial measures, and 
leading and lagging indicators. In the original version of the BSC, the 
dimensions of organisational performance are classified as follows: 
 
•  Financial Perspective: How do our investors see us? 
•  Customer Perspective: How do our customers see us? 
•  Business Process Perspective: What must we excel at? 
•  Organisational Learning and Growth Perspective: How can we 
innovate and improve? 
 
The four perspectives are held to be inter-linked and none is pre-eminent. (See 
Figure One.) However, as originally formulated they have proved to be of 
limited relevance for many organisations.  Consequently the BSC has been 
adopted flexibly in practice and, subsequently, more perspectives suggested, 
such as one for corporate social responsibility or sustainability (Olve et al., 
1999). 
 
There have been problems of appropriately trading-off and weighting 
performance on one perspective against that on another (success on other 
perspectives, for example, may be accompanied by increased cost). Also the 
BSC is a strategic instrument and initially there were some difficulties in linking 
the strategic to the tactical and operational levels. Therefore, Kaplan & Norton 
went on to advocate using strategy maps, which are 'visualisations' of an 
organisation's  objectives, targets and plans, to counter difficulties in 'drilling 
down' from the strategic level (Kaplan & Norton, 1996b). 
 
Intriguingly, a similar approach, called the Tableau de Bord (TdB), has been 
practised in France since the 1920s (Lebas, 1996). The TdB was developed 
originally by industrial engineers. It is less formal than the BSC and is intended 
as a 'piloting' instrument (hence it is sometimes translated as the 'dashboard'). 
Any particular dashboard is customised  around critical success factors and 
key performance indicators (financial and physical) specific to the organisation. 
 
There has been considerable debate regarding the merits of the BSC versus 
those of the TdB. (See, for example, Epstein & Manzoni, 1998; Nørreklit, 2003; 
Bourgignon, Malleret & Nørreklit, 2004; Bessire & Baker, 2005; Bukh & Malmi, 
2005.) Nevertheless, despite these disagreements and some difficulties in 
practice, it is generally agreed to be logical to adopt some form of multiple 
performance evaluation model rather than to rely on a single indicator. 
 
Performance Indicators and the Ambulance Service 
However, the previous performance measurement regime did not fit with this.  
There were four key performance indicators, varying according to category of 
patient, but all related to the timeliness of responses (Department of Health, 
2005 - Figure Two). Therefore, ambulance services were not being judged on 
the total package of care they provided. 
 
It is revealing to view this regime in relation to developments in the ambulance 
service.  Rapid response times are clearly important, but what happens at the 
scene is also significant. Traditionally the role of emergency ambulance staff 
was seen as solely transporting patients rapidly to hospital Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) units. This no longer applies because of the changing roles 
and capabilities of ambulance staff and the availability of NHS facilities in the 
community (Department of Health, 2005; Healthcare Commission, 2008). 
Indeed it has been policy under successive governments to promote an 
enhanced role for paramedical activities at the scene, in terms of providing 
care and giving advice, and to reduce significantly the number of patients 
taken to A&E departments by ambulance. Instead the role of ambulance 
clinicians is emphasised. They are qualified to provide clinical assessment and 
care to patients, not just transportation (Department of Health, 2005; National 
Audit Office, 2011). 
 
The performance management regime contrasted to this development (Heath 
& Radcliffe, 2007; Heath & Radcliffe, 2010), as did the prevailing culture within  
ambulance services (Radcliffe & Heath, 2009; Wankhade, 2012). The 
narrowness of the indicators was particularly significant because most services 
perform well against national standards; but performance is more variable in 
those aspects which receive less national attention (Healthcare Commission, 
2008). Therefore, aspects of performance other than response times tended 
to be downplayed. Moreover, the narrow range of indicators was notorious for 
promoting gaming (Bevan & Hamblin, 2009; Hood, 2006; Radnor, 2008). Thus 
the performance management regime for ambulance services exemplified the 
potential of performance measures to promote dysfunctional behaviour as it 
fell into many of the pitfalls identified in the literature (Heath & Radcliffe, 2007; 
Wankhade & Brinkman, 2011). 
 
Therefore, over time the performance measures became very controversial, 
leading to a report from the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI 2003). 
The Commission recognised that measuring outcomes of emergency 
ambulance care is complicated by the difficulty ambulance trusts may face in 
obtaining data from acute hospital trusts and in the problems of developing 
data bases across organisational boundaries. Nevertheless, the Commission 
concluded that 
 
‘A priority for ambulance trusts must be to develop credible measures of    
outcome… (which) should be included among ambulance  service key targets 
in future.’             
(Op. Cit., pp. 22) 
 
Consequently, the Department of Health (2005, pp. 56) proposed that for 
patients presenting conditions which may be immediately life threatening, the 
first two performance measures be retained. 
 
‘For all other patients, ambulance trusts are to be assessed on the overall 
quality of care provided… ’   
 
The proposed wider set of indicators was not forthcoming immediately, 
although standardisation was attempted through the ‘Call to Connect’ targets. 
They defined response times more stringently and reduced the variation in 
interpretation (Wankhade, 2011), but had further perverse effects (Woollard, 
O’Meara & Munro, 2010). 
 
New Ambulance Performance Regime 
In December, 2010, however, the new coalition government announced the 
introduction of a range of ‘clinical’ quality indicators for ambulance services to 
take effect in April, 2011. Timeliness was still seen as important, but not the 
only important factor (Department of Health, 2010a). The eleven indicators 
were set out initially in broad terms (Department of Health, 2010b - Figure 
Three.) This rather broad brush description was filled out in a paper by  Cooke, 
who had played a major part in the development of the indicators (Cooke, 
2011). 
 
He stated that the proposals were based on three key principles: the regime 
should be evidence-based, move from a target-culture to one of continuous 
improvement in clinical care and provide information to patients and the public 
to enable them to judge the quality of care provided. Ambulance services were 
to publish their results and a narrative explanation. The report was intended 
to be meaningful, by focussing on outcomes where available or on process 
indicators which have a proven link to outcome (Cooke, 2011). Ambulance 
services, therefore, are supposed to share information and work with others 
to develop a whole systems approach. 
 
The results of the indicators are now published monthly in the form of a 
dashboard for each of the ambulance services in England1  comprising four 
clinical indicators and eight process or systems indicators. (Calls closed via 
telephone advice and following treatment at the scene are separated out, as 
are re-contact rates.) The clinical indicators are published with a three months 
time lag after the systems indicators because of the time required for the 
outcomes of patients transported by ambulance to be established (Gov. UK, 
2013). In addition, it was intended that a narrative account of the experience 
of ambulance service users should also be presented. Services were to be 
allowed to develop their approaches to these narratives individually, but the 
account should utilise qualitative and quantitative methods, not just statistical 
measures of customer satisfaction derived from questionnaires. However, it 
seems that patient experience is not currently reported, possibly because of 
the  variation in approaches between ambulance trusts.   
 
The new indicators are meant to be considered as a set which forms the basis 
of patient-centred continuous improvement, because each indicator taken 
individually has weaknesses and there is also the unacceptable danger that 
one can be improved at the expense of another (Cooke, 2011). The set of 
indicators is reviewed annually, although it is not clear how this is being done.   
 
Quality Accounts 
The Health Act 2009 required all organisations which provide NHS services in 
England to publish Quality Accounts from April 2010, unless they provide 
primary care or NHS continuing care services or are defined as being a 'small' 
provider2 (Department of Health, 2012a). This means that ambulance services 
in England now publish Quality Accounts annually. They are intended to 
promote: 
•  scrutiny of, debate about and reflection on the performance of NHS 
organisations; 
•  accountability of service providers, both upwards and outwards towards 
stakeholders; 
•  benchmarking of performance; 
•  continuous, evidence-based quality improvement programmes;   and 
•  engagement of stakeholders. 
 
Some parts of the Quality Accounts are mandatory and set out in guide lines. 
They must include: 
•  a statement summarising the quality of the service provided; 
•  a set of priorities for improving quality in the coming year; 
•  a plan of how to achieve these priorities;   and 
•  a more detailed review of the quality of service in the past year in terms 
of patient safety, clinical effectiveness and patient experience. 
(Department of Health, 2010c) 
 
However, it was intended that most of the content of the report was to be 
determined locally, including the performance indicators provided. This 
reflected the desire that Quality Accounts be developed in an ongoing and 
reinforcing process of involving and engaging stakeholders, including service 
users and their community advocates. The accounts should be presented to 
be accessible, utilising both quantitative and qualitative information to give a 
rounded picture and based on accurate, reliable and relevant data 
(Department of Health, 2010c). 
 
Quality Accounts must be published on NHS Choices3 and hard copies made 
available on request. Health service organisations may also choose to publish 
them elsewhere; for instance, on their web sites. Organisations which are NHS 
acute or mental health trusts or NHS foundation trusts are now required to 
have their Quality Accounts externally audited; but ambulance trusts, which 
are not foundation trusts, do not need to do so (Department of Health, 2012a). 
 
Foot & Ross (2010) carried out focus group research with representatives of 
local communities prior to the launch of Quality Accounts. Participants 
welcomed the idea of Quality Accounts, were keen to be involved in selecting 
priorities and quality indicators, and recognised the potential for increasing 
accountability for quality improvement. However, they were concerned that, in 
practice, there would be issues around the reliability of information in the 
accounts, presenting the information in ways which were comprehensible to 
lay readers, trading off national and local priorities, and establishing 
meaningful two way dialogue leading to action. Interestingly, they also felt 
that the definition of quality applied was too narrow. 
 
Subsequently, Foot, Raleigh, Ross & Lyscom (2011) analysed a sample of the 
first round of published Quality Accounts, which bore out these fears to some 
extent. There was considerable variation in numerous respects; for example, 
the number of quality measures  and the aspects of performance measured. 
The types of measures used tended to concentrate on indicators which were 
already required (e.g. waiting times), the measures were often presented 
without definition, context or discussion and presentations often used tables 
of diverse and unrelated measures. The usefulness of the accounts for 
benchmarking was limited by the lack of comparative data. Effective 
involvement of stakeholders was also identified as a weakness. 
 Foot et al. hold that the extreme variation in the reports over almost all 
dimensions led to a lack of comparability, weakening them as instruments of 
accountability.  They argue, therefore, for greater consistency in, for example, 
definitions and formats and some mandatory content (including some 
performance measures), whilst maintaining a local dimension. Some 
fundamental tensions in the approach were also identified, such as 
comprehensiveness versus readability and simplicity versus statistical rigour. 
Of particular significance, there is the issue of the very broad set of audiences 
for Quality Accounts and, related to this, whether the emphasis should be on 
benchmarking for local quality improvement or on public accountability. 
 
The emphasis on the local development of accounts should have considerable 
merits in terms of developing stakeholder engagement, deliberation and 
reflexivity and in addressing local information needs. However, it does mean 
that each ambulance service in England could produce markedly different 
types of report, hampering comparability and benchmarking. The 'bottom up 
philosophy' of Quality Accounts is is also at odds with that of the dashboard, 
which is a standardised set of indicators, imposed 'top down'. 
 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that in the 2012/13 round of Quality 
Accounts, mandatory reporting of a very small, core set of quality indicators 
is being introduced; applying initially to NHS acute, mental health and 
ambulance trusts (Department of Health, 2012b). The indicators which must 
be reported in table format in the Quality Accounts of ambulance trusts 
(Department of Health, 2013) are shown in Figure Four. They are drawn from 
the dashboard indicators, although the logic behind this particular selection is 
not clear. 
 
Puzzles of performance 
Controversies about performance within the wider public sector include top-
down, bottom-up or balanced approaches to performance measurement 
(OECD-PUMA,  1997);  the complexities of running public services (Talbot, 
2005); manipulation and deception (Bevan & Hood, 2006); unintended conse-
quences (Smith, 1995); and the performance paradox (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). 
Agreement is also lacking about definitions of performance, methods of meas-
urement, whether performance measurement increases efficiency of services 
and on issues of accountability (Power, 1994; De Bruijn, 2002; Greiling, 2006). 
 
The literature reveals many models of performance but few offer clear theo-
retical explanation or empirical validation (Talbot, 2005). The work of Meyer 
& Gupta (1994) on “paradoxes of performance” suggests a weak correlation 
between performance indicators and performance itself over a given period of 
time. (The previous performance regime in the English ambulance service can 
be seen as a classic example of this.) Performance measurement has also 
come under criticism for its lack of integration within the democratic process 
and poor implementation (Public Administration Select Committee, 2003).   
 
Denhardt & Denhardt (2000) present a New Public Service (NPS) approach as 
an  alternative to both old public administration and the NPM, calling for a 
greater public participation in the delivery of public provisions. The emphasis 
is not on steering (NPM) or rowing (public administration), but serving. Liddle 
(2007) argued that a new public governance model (NPG) would strengthen 
democratic control over decision making and citizen involvement, as well as 
improving public trust in government institutions and types of services 
provided. However, governance (like NPM in many ways) lacks a precise 
definition and has been used in different context and applications (Minogue, 
Polidano & Hulme, 1998). 
 
It is interesting to compare the development of performance  management in 
the ambulance service to other emergency services; i.e. the police and fire 
and rescue services. De Maillarde & Savage (2012) trace the ethos of 
performance management in the police in Britain back to the Financial 
Management Initiative of the  1980s. A central element of this was the 
measurement and assessment of outputs against  organisational objectives 
and the construction of 'league tables'. The Audit Commission then produced 
the first set of statutory national performance indicators for the police, which 
were published in 1995. These were criticised for stressing quantitative 
measures of performance and the suite of indicators was extended to reflect 
qualitative issues (although these were still measured quantitatively as 
percentage satisfaction ratings). The incoming Labour government of 1997 
enhanced this regime further, shifting the emphasis from performance 
measurement to performance management; for example, through the use of 
targets. The coalition  government has from 2010 emphatically reversed the 
trend to national performance targets, but replaced this with more frequent 
and detailed publication of local performance information. 
 
Performance management came relatively late to Fire and Rescue  Services 
(FRSs). Murphy & Greenhalgh (2013) argue that the impact of performance 
indicators was much more muted than elsewhere until the Comprehensive 
Spending Review of 2005. For FRSs this entailed assessments of whole 
services, including operational services and emergency preparedness, rather 
than just 'back-office' functions. Assessments were based on national 
standards and benchmarks and key performance indicators, assembled in 
three dimensions: service assessment, 'direction of travel' (evidence of 
improvement) and use of resources. After 2010, the new government 
announced the abandonment of a number of national targets whilst 
emphasising the 'need to do more from less'. Murphy & Grenhalgh (2013) 
expect a hybrid regime to emerge for FRSs, with some national indicators from 
the previous national frame work persisting, alongside others designed at local 
discretion. 
 
Thus the ambulance performance management regime has some similarities 
with those of other emergency services (e.g. embracing then rejecting 'targets'; 
at least, rhetorically), but also significant differences (e.g. developing from 
less to more indicators or vice versa), and there is no clear pattern of evolution. 
 
Discussion 
It is noteworthy that the thinking behind the dashboard reflects the debates 
around the previous performance measurement regime. Both criticisms of the 
regime and the research on the role of the ambulance service seem to have 
influenced the changes. 
 
Taking Healthcare to the Patient (Department of Health, 2005) envisaged 
involving “patients and public” in designing future services to meet the needs 
of a diverse and multicultural society.  It focuses on increasing the range of 
services in primary care, diagnostics and health promotion. Rather than just 
being transported to hospital, ambulance services should be able to take 
patients to a greater range of appropriate facilities, thus improving care and 
experience. These intended benefits can be challenging since the emotional 
and physical state of the patient/user of the service may be relevant to gauge 
the correct level of service. Within the larger debates between NPM and NPS 
or NPG, it is important to examine the extent to which the current ambulance 
performance frameworks exhibit public involvement and patient participation. 
 
Cooke (2011) acknowledged that time targets had been the main driver of 
change, but that it is necessary to know the outcomes of interventions in order 
to improve the system. It was accepted that delays in care lead to worse 
outcomes and that patient satisfaction increases when appropriate advice and 
care is received promptly. Nevertheless, the danger is recognised of perverse 
incentives from emphasising time taken alone, without examining the quality 
of care. Moreover, it is acknowledged that the role of emergency care has 
changed so that many patients previously taken to A&E are now successfully 
cared for by telephone advice, face to face interaction by ambulance clinicians 
or transfer to other health care facilities.   
 
In the new approach, the idea of indicators as targets is rejected as they are 
held to give no incentive to achieve more than the target (the ‘minimum 
becomes the maximum’) and means become an end. Instead the government 
intends to promote a culture of continuous improvement whereby data will 
motivate learning and innovation to gain further improvement repeatedly. 
Such a culture, if developed effectively, would presumably also mitigate 
against any tendency to gaming. 
 
A number of important questions arise from this. For example, how easy will 
it be to establish a culture of continuous improvement and how will this be 
done? It seems there are links between continuous improvement and whole 
systems solutions in the government’s thinking. However, doubts remain about 
approaches such as ‘lean thinking’ in this context and sharing information 
between ambulance trusts and other parts of the health service has proved 
difficult in the past (Heath & Radcliffe, 2010). 
 
Moving from a very limited set of indicators to a much broader one, whilst 
welcome in itself, may also give rise to difficulties. The measures may indeed 
turn out to be a balanced set of indicators for the ambulance service or they 
may just make assessment of service performance too complex to be 
meaningful. It may be that, in practice, some of the indicators will be stressed, 
simplifying the issues faced but giving rise to new forms of gaming. 
 
Interestingly, however, financial aspects do not form part of the  dashboard, 
which may weaken it as something akin to a balanced scorecard. The extent 
to which the performance indicators feed into strategic management, business 
planning and budgeting of ambulance services is, therefore, an important issue. 
For example, will there be difficulties in 'drilling down'? 
 
In any case, evidence about the use of the BSC in healthcare, is rather mixed. Reviewing the 
international evidence, Zelman, Pink & Matthias (2003) concluded that modifications are required, 
reflecting industry and organisational realities, to make it more relevant. Other commentators 
(Kocakülâh & Austill, 2007; Niven, 2011) also caution against indiscriminate use of the BSC. 
Surveying its use in the UK NHS, Radnor & Lowell (2003) suggested several underlying 
conceptual concerns and implementation pitfalls, arguing against ‘blind’ implementation without 
consideration of factors which may result in potential ‘failure’. In another study in the NHS, Chang, 
Lin & Northcott (2002), highlighted the conceptual ‘muddle’ in  claims that the new Performance 
Assessment Framework (PAF) was a “balanced scorecard” approach. Chang (2007) then 
concluded that the use of the PAF by local health authorities was primarily for legitimacy seeking 
purposes, with little impact on improving performance valued locally. 
 
Whilst the emphasis on the external reporting of achievement against the 
indicators seems encouraging, it will be interesting to see how this develops. 
What difficulties are there, both in obtaining and presenting information? To 
what extent does the process of reporting increase genuine accountability and 
dialogue between the service and its stakeholders? As accountability involves 
not just 'giving an account' but also 'being held to account' (Stewart, 1984), 
could the reporting instead just become an empty ritual of giving  accounts? 
 
It is also unclear as to what extent the views of ambulance staff and other 
stakeholders were accessed and used in setting up the new regime or how 
they participate in the revisions promised. A whole series of issues regarding 
training and resource allocation also arises. All of the above raises many 
questions, which could form the basis for research into the new performance 
regime and its effects on ambulance service practice. 
 
Quality Accounts echo the NPS/NPG literature on participation. However, it is 
desirable to explore both the practical issues which arise and the extent to 
which they actually contribute towards the ambitious objectives of more 
debate and reflection on performance, increased accountability, better 
benchmarking, evidence-based continuous improvement programmes and 
greater stakeholder engagement. In particular, the tension between internal 
benchmarking and external accountability identified by Foot et al. (2011) is an 
appropriate topic for further investigation. Again, the extent to which the 
dashboard and Quality Accounts are based on different approaches to 
performance reporting and accountability seems likely to be significant. 
 
Finally, and importantly, the effects of the new performance measurement 
arrangements on the culture of ambulance services and the behaviour of 
ambulance personnel are issues of much interest and significance. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have set out issues around the measurement of performance 
in the English ambulance service and outlined a research agenda to explore 
them further. Until recently, evaluation of ambulance services related to only 
one aspect of performance: response times. There is evidence that the narrow 
set of indicators did not capture the multi-faceted nature of contemporary 
ambulance work and had  perverse effects, such as promoting gaming. This is 
in line with the established literature on performance management in the 
public sector. Instead, it was suggested that more measures, including 
indicators of clinical outcome, were required to arrive at a balanced 
assessment of performance; but that this is difficult to put into operation 
effectively. 
 
Consequently, the new performance measurement framework has welcome 
aspects, but the way in which dashboards are developed and applied is an 
important subject for research. Similarly, whilst there are encouraging features 
to the introduction of Quality Accounts, monitoring their progress in practice 
is also required. Indeed, the way the two sets of performance reporting 
interact should also be investigated. This is likely to be a particular issue as 
the 'philosophies' of the two approaches differ. 
 
Whilst some compromise may be in order, we argue that the process of refining 
the indicators should be deliberative and involve as wide a range of 
stakeholders as possible. Therefore, one aspect of future research into the new 
regime might focus beneficially on its utility in clarifying both how the service 
is actually used and how this is valued by the public and ambulance service 
professionals. 
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Figure One: The Balanced Scorecard 
 
 
STATUS PERFORMANCE INDICATOR 
Immediately life threatening 
(Category A) 
Response within 8 minutes irrespective 
of location in 75% of cases 
Immediately life threatening 
(Category A) 
Fully equipped ambulance in attendance 
within 14/19 minutes of initial call in 
95% of cases (unless control room 
decides an ambulance is not required) 
Urgent need for hospital care 
defined by doctor 
Patient should arrive at hospital within 
15 minutes of arrival time specified by 
the doctor in 95% of cases 
All other patients 
(Category B/C) 
Response within 14 minutes (urban) or 
19 minutes (rural) 
 
Figure Two: National Performance Requirements for Ambulance 
Services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 Outcome from acute ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) 
2 Outcome from cardiac arrest – return of spontaneous circulation 
3 Outcome from cardiac arrest – survival to discharge 
4 Outcome following stroke for ambulance patients 
5 Proportion of calls closed with telephone advice or managed without 
transport to A&E (where clinically appropriate) 
6 Re-contact rate following discharge of care (i.e. closure with 
telephone advice or following treatment at the scene) 
7 Call abandonment rate 
8 Time to answer calls 
9 Service experience 
10 The eight minute response time concerning immediately life 
threatening cases and provision of transport within nineteen minutes 
where needed 
11 Time to treatment by an ambulance-dispatched health professional 
Figure  Three: List of Ambulance Clinical Quality Indicators. 
 
 
1 Percentage of Category A telephone calls resulting in a response at the 
scene of the emergency within eight minutes. 
2 Percentage of Category A telephone calls resulting in an ambulance 
response at the scene within nineteen minutes. 
3 Percentage of patients with pre-existing diagnosis of ST elevation 
myocardial infarction who received an appropriate care bundle. 
4 Percentage of patients with suspected stroke who received an 
appropriate care bundle. 
Figure  Four: Quality Indicators to be Included in English 
Ambulance Service Quality Accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 1There are currently ten ambulance services in England: East Midlands; 
East of England; London; North East; North West; South Central; South East; 
South Western; West Midlands; and Yorkshire. (Special arrangements apply to 
the Isle of Wight.) 
2. 2A small provider has a total income from NHS services of not more than 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                                 
£130,000 per annum and employs less  than 50 staff. 
1. 3NHS Choices is the UK's online health information service. (It is the 
UK's third biggest government website.) 
